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Executive Summary
UN peacekeepers started paying attention to their
environmental impact beginning in the 2000s with
the deployment of several new large-scale
operations. These missions have drastically more
staff and infrastructure than previous ones and are
deployed in countries without the basic infrastruc-
ture necessary for tasks like waste management. As
a result, they import massive amounts of materials
and people into the areas where they operate,
increasing their environmental footprint.
Moreover, these missions are often situated
alongside fragile rural and urban communities,
exposing wide disparities between these communi-
ties and the peacekeepers in their consumption and
waste patterns.
Growing attention to potential environmental
damage caused by the UN has led to calls for an
environmental strategy for UN peace operations.
In 2013, the UN Security Council for the first time
gave a peacekeeping operation (the UN mission in
Mali) a direct mandate to address the environ-
mental consequences of its activities. This came in
parallel with measures taken by the Departments
for Peacekeeping Operations and Field Support
(DPKO/DFS), including the adoption of an
Environmental Policy for UN Field Missions in
2009 and the creation of an Environment Section in
2016, which has developed an Environment
Strategy. The number of staff dedicated to environ-
mental issues has also increased at headquarters
and in the field, and training materials focused on
environmental issues have been developed. In
addition, a number of small-scale success stories
have provided best practices and lessons learned
for other missions.
However, peace operations face a number of
limits and constraints in implementing environ-
mental policies and strategies. First, these are
unevenly implemented among missions due to
disparities in terms of staff allocation, budget,
equipment, local circumstances, and senior leader-
ship. Second, UN headquarters has had difficulty
ensuring oversight of missions and assessing their
performance. Third, the UN’s organizational
culture and member states’ preferences restrict the
design and operation of missions, particularly in
terms of sourcing and procurement. The UN
Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission
in Mali (MINUSMA) is a good example of how
these constraints can manifest themselves on the
ground.
Based on this analysis, the reports puts forward a
series of recommendations. Several short-term
recommendations concern the full implementation
of the Environment Strategy and the achievement
of its objectives:
• Increase financial and human resources
dedicated to the implementation of the
Environment Strategy and to planning.
• Implement mandatory training on environ-
mental management for all personnel in
missions.
• Systematically collect data on environmental
management from all missions and disseminate
lessons learned and best practices.
• Use local capacities where feasible.
Due to the difficulty of implementing them, the
following recommendations are medium-term
targets:
• Continue to reinforce oversight by systematically
monitoring performance indicators and fostering
data ownership and accountability.
• Extend DFS’s partnership with UNEP.
• Advocate for member states to support sustain-
able environmental management in peace
operations.
The final recommendation is long-term:
• Develop comprehensive indicators and an
integrated approach to environmental concerns.
Introduction
In 2010, just nine months after the 7.0 magnitude
earthquake that struck Haiti, the mismanagement
of wastewater in the UN Stabilization Mission in
Haiti’s (MINUSTAH) Mirebalais camp triggered a
cholera epidemic that killed more than 9,000
people and affected nearly 807,000.1 In August
2016, Philip Alston, special rapporteur on extreme
poverty and human rights, dedicated his annual
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1 UN General Assembly, New Approach to Cholera in Haiti: Report of the Secretary-General, UN Doc. A/71/895, May 3, 2017, p. 4.
report to the cholera outbreak, stating “the
scientific evidence points overwhelmingly to the
conclusion that the arrival of Nepalese
peacekeepers and the outbreak of cholera are
directly linked to one another.”2
This disastrous case drew attention to the
negative effect UN peace operations can have on the
surrounding communities and the environment in
which they are active and the environmental
footprint they can leave. This is despite the
Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO)
and Department of Field Support’s (DFS) 2009
Environmental Policy for UN Field Missions, which
was intended to prevent environmental misman-
agement. Since the 2000s, UN peace operations
have been increasingly aware of environmental
challenges, especially as a consequence of their own
expansion. Recent transformations in peacekeeping
practices and the contexts in which missions
operate have also led to more significant environ-
mental impacts. In recent decades, UN peace
operations have been deployed on a large scale in
hundreds of fragile rural and urban sites. The
material footprint of peace operations in these
environments includes physical infrastructure such
as bases, camps, super-camps, headquarters,
logistics hubs, and airfields. These are long-term
features that seriously (and often negatively) impact
local communities and the environment.3
In 2018, the United Nations is conducting fifteen
peacekeeping operations worldwide, with total
spending of $6.8 billion and a total of 106,338
personnel deployed in the field.4 In 2016,
peacekeeping operations covered an area of over a
million square kilometers, and the yearly expendi-
ture on buildings and construction, real estate, and
heating and cooling totaled $448,287,372. The
various missions included more than 270 UN-
constructed bases, super-camps, and outposts and
310 medical clinics.5
This report deals with the environmental
consequences of UN peace operations. Its main
focus is the institutional arrangements and policies
currently in place to reduce their environmental
footprint and prevent environmental damage.6 In
the first part, we address the challenging contexts
in which UN peace operations are active. Their
presence results in multiple environmental
concerns that have been receiving growing institu-
tional attention.
The second part is dedicated to DFS’s environ-
mental approach, including policies and guidelines,
staff and units, training material, small-scale
projects, and efforts to mainstream environmental
management in daily operations.
The third part assesses the challenges DFS faces
in the implementation of its Environment Strategy,
launched in 2016 and in effect since January 2017.
The mainstreaming and fulfillment of the different
objectives set up in the strategy are slowed down by
disparities among missions that lead to uneven
implementation of the environmental policy,
difficulty in ensuring oversight from UN headquar-
ters, and the politics of sourcing and procurement.
Drawing on an examination of the UN presence
in sub-Saharan Africa, the fourth part uses the UN
Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission
in Mali (MINUSMA) as a case study to examine the
material footprint of UN peace operations from a
comprehensive, urban perspective. It draws on
practical and analytical expertise in architecture,
urbanism, anthropology, landscaping, economics,
military engineering, and policy gathered from
workshops, field trips, and design exercises.
Based on this analysis, the fifth part suggests a
series of recommendations to improve current
practices and prevent short- and long-term environ-
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2 UN General Assembly, Report of the Special Rapporteur on Extreme Poverty and Human Rights, advance unedited version, UN Doc. A/71/40823, August 26, 2016,
p. 4.
3 Malkit Shoshan, BLUE: The Architecture of UN Peacekeeping, Dutch entry at the 15th International Architecture Exhibition, May 2016.
4 See UN Peacekeeping, “Peacekeeping Operations Fact Sheet,” December 31, 2017, available at
https://peacekeeping.un.org/sites/default/files/pk_fact_sheet_dec_17.pdf .
5 See UN Procurement Division, “Statistics,” available at https://www.un.org/Depts/ptd/statistics/2016 ; and Shoshan, BLUE: The Architecture of UN Peacekeeping.
6 The paper relies on a thorough analysis of UN publications and gray literature, as well as on data collected through interviews and observations as part of an
independent research project in political science. See Lucile Maertens, “From Green to Blue: Securitization of the Environment within the United Nations”
(original title in French: “Quand le Bleu passe au vert: La sécurisation de l’environnement à l’ONU”) (PhD diss., Sciences Po Paris and University of Geneva, 2015).
The spatial, socio-economic and urban aspects and the case study on Mali draws on broad practical and analytical expertise in architecture, urbanism, anthro-
pology, landscaping, economics, military engineering, and policy gathered through workshops, field trips, and design exercises in part of the super-camp in Gao.
See Malkit Shoshan and Jane Szita, “Reimagining the Peacekeeping Mission: Legacy Scenarios for Camp Castor,” Het Nieuwe Instituut, January 2015, available at
https://drones-honeycombs.hetnieuweinstituut.nl/sites/default/files/workshop_report._gao_legacy.pdf ; and the publication “BLUE: Architecture of UN
Peacekeeping Missions,” Archis, 2016, pp. 1-48.
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mental damage in the context of UN peace
operations. Differentiating between short-,
medium-, and long-term recommendations, it
suggests how to strengthen financial and human
resources dedicated to addressing environmental
issues in missions, mainstream eco-friendly
practices through training and best practices,
advocate for stronger oversight, carefully build local
capacity through local sourcing, and improve
current indicators. A UN presence in fragile and
conflict-prone areas should not be a source of stress
but should improve local environmental sustain-
ability and build resilience, especially since such
actions are inexorably linked to conflict prevention.7
Challenging Environments
GROWING INSTITUTIONAL ATTENTION
In the 1960s and 1970s, major environmental
incidents and concerns about their effects on
human health brought ecological issues onto the
international agenda. Two decades after the First
Earth Summit in Stockholm, the 1992 UN
Conference on Environment and Development in
Rio de Janeiro led to the adoption of three signifi-
cant international treaties (on climate change,
biodiversity, and desertification)8 and international
recognition of the concept of sustainable develop-
ment (elaborated in the 1987 Brundtland Report).
In light of growing environmental concerns at the
international level, the UN Advance Mission in
Cambodia (UNAMIC, 1991–1992) marked the
beginning of UN peacekeepers’ concern with
natural resources. As far as environmental issues
are concerned, the mission’s main focus was the
role of timber in financing the conflict.9
UN peacekeepers only really started to pay
attention to their own environmental impact
beginning in the 2000s. The UN Secretariat realized
the environmental challenge of peace operations
around 2004 and 2005, with the deployment of new
large-scale operations in Darfur (2004–present),
Haiti (2004–2017), Sudan/South Sudan (2005–
present), and Chad/the Central African Republic
(2007–2010).10 The number of staff and amount of
infrastructure drastically increased in these
missions in comparison with previous ones.
Moreover, these peace operations were deployed in
countries without basic infrastructure, which is
necessary for tasks like waste management.
This increasing attention on environmental
concerns was part of a global movement in the field
of humanitarian action. The UN High
Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) began
paying attention to the environmental impact of its
activities within and outside of its refugee camps
from the late 1980s, and especially after the 1992 Rio
Summit.11 Humanitarian actors more strongly
acknowledged the issue in the 2005 Humanitarian
Reform Agenda, which introduced the cluster
approach. Because of its crosscutting dimension, the
environment was not institutionalized as a separate
cluster, but a number of key documents and
guidelines recognized the importance of environ-
mental concerns in international interventions.
In addition, the Joint UNEP/Office for the
Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA)
Environmental Unit has also worked “to promote
that environmental issues are an integral part of all
elements of humanitarian response.… This means
that environmental concerns are addressed and
considered in needs assessment and analysis,
strategic response planning, resource mobilization,
performance monitoring and evaluation.”12 Even
though the unit still indicated in its 2014 study that
there was an urgent need to systematically address
a range of issues related to leadership and account-
ability, there is growing interest in addressing the
environmental impacts of humanitarian action,
including from governments.13 In the outcome
declaration of the 2012 Earth Summit, UN member
states “call[ed] upon the United Nations system to
7    UN Secretary-General, “Priorities: Prevention,” available at https://www.un.org/sg/en/priorities/prevention.shtml .
8     Hayley Stevenson, Global Environmental Politics: Problems, Policy and Practice (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press (2017), p. 123.
9     UNEP, Greening the Blue Helmets: Environment, Natural Resources and UN Peacekeeping Operations, 2012, p. 43, available at 
www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/publications/UNEP_greening_blue_helmets.pdf .
10  Lucile Maertens, “Quand les Casques bleus passent au vert: Environnementalisation des activités de maintien de la paix de l’ONU,” Études internationales 47, 
no. 1 (2016).
11  Lucile Maertens, “Le HCR et l’appropriation progressive de l’agenda environnemental,” in Mobilité humaine et environnement: Du global au local, Christel
Cournil and Chloé Vlassopoulos, eds. (Paris: Éditions Quæ, 2015).
12  See OCHA, “Environmental Emergencies,” available at www.unocha.org/themes/environmental-emergencies .
13  Joint UNEP/OCHA Environment Unit, Environment and Humanitarian Action: Increasing Effectiveness, Sustainability and Accountability, August 2014, available
at https://www.unocha.org/sites/unocha/files/EHA%20Study%20webfinal_1.pdf .
  4                                                                                                                                      Lucile Maertens and Malkit Shoshan
improve the management of facilities and
operations, by taking into account sustainable
development practices.”14
Concerns about the environmental impact of UN
peace operations also echo a growing institutional
attention to the environmental footprint of the UN
system. On June 5, 2007, Secretary-General Ban Ki-
moon publicly requested that UN institutions lead
by example and “go green.” The UN Climate
Neutral Strategy was approved in October 2007 by
the Chief Executives Board.15 As a result of this
decision, the “Greening the Blue” program was
launched to fulfill three commitments: to measure,
to reduce, and to offset when feasible. Heads of
agencies committed to expanding measurement of
their environmental impact for the Greening the
Blue annual reports by adding data on waste
management by 2016, on the use of drinking water
resources by 2018, and on staff training by 2019.
Although the program is not compulsory, since
2009, the UN has presented an annual report on its
environmental footprint and efforts to reduce it:
sixty-seven UN entities participated in the calcula-
tion of UN carbon emissions for the 2017 edition,
and fifty-six provided data on waste management.16
In parallel, the UN Environmental Management
Group, established in 2001, has sought to gather all
UN programs, funds, and agencies to enhance “UN
system-wide collaboration and coherent responses
on environmental matters.”17 After participating in
the group’s meetings since 2008, DFS’s proactive
request to join the group was accepted.
It is in the context of these efforts that UNEP
produced a report dedicated to UN peace
operations in 2012. This report, entitled Greening
the Blue Helmets: Environment, Natural Resources
and UN Peacekeeping Operations, was developed in
close cooperation with DFS and DPKO. The report
was divided into two parts: the first dealt with the
environmental footprint of operations, while the
second touched on natural resources, conflicts, and
peacekeeping. The first part proposed evaluating
the implementation of the 2009 Environmental
Policy and listed “good practices” for energy
efficiency and other eco-friendly practices.18 The
report also emphasized the need for more action at
UN headquarters and in field missions.
Based on this study, UNEP developed an online
training course on the environment and
peacekeeping in partnership with the UN Institute
for Training and Research (UNITAR) and the
International Institute for Sustainable Develop -
ment (IISD), and with the support of DPKO and
DFS. It also intended to set up a five-year partner-
ship with DFS to facilitate the implementation of
the 2009 Environmental Policy. With Under-
Secretary-General for Field Support Atul Khare’s
strong commitment to address these issues, in
2016, DFS and UNEP established a project for
UNEP to provide technical assistance to DFS.19
UNEP’s support for addressing the environ-
mental impact of peacekeeping was further
strengthened by the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable
Development, adopted in September 2015, and the
Paris Agreement on climate change, adopted in
December 2015. These agreements set goals and
targets for all countries, further incentivizing the
UN to improve environmental management of its
activities and fully implement the “do no harm”
principle.
ENVIRONMENTAL CONCERNS AND
ISSUES AT STAKE FOR UN PEACE
OPERATIONS
International relations researcher Kai Kenkel
described the UN’s transition to larger multidi-
mensional missions mentioned earlier as
advancing “from the thin blue line to painting a
country blue.”20 Although he was referring to the
expanding scope of peace operations at large and
the broadening tasks of peacekeepers, this shift is
14  UN General Assembly Resolution 66/288, The Future We Want (July 27, 2012), UN Doc. A/RES/66/288, September 11, 2012, para. 96.
15  Lucile Maertens and Marieke Louis, “Quand les organisations internationales se mettent au vert: Acteurs, instruments et effets de l’appropriation de la question
environnementale,” Études internationales 47, no. 1 (2016). 
16  UNEP, Greening the Blue Report 2017: The UN System’s Environmental Footprint and Efforts to Reduce It, 2017, available at 
www.greeningtheblue.org/resources/climate-neutrality .
17  See http://unemg.org/ .
18  UNEP, Greening the Blue Helmets.
19  UN Field Support, DFS Environment Strategy, “Executive Summary,” April 2017, p. 1, available at
http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/publications/UNDFS_Environment_Strategy_ExecSum_vF.pdf .
20  Kai Michael Kenkel, “Five Generations of Peace Operations: From the ‘Thin Blue Line’ to ‘Painting a Country Blue,’” Revista Brasileira de Política Internacional
56, no. 1 (2013).
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also reflected in the spatial manifestation and
footprint of peace operations. More bases and
headquarters had to be constructed locally to
accommodate the growing numbers of
peacekeepers. These new facilities were erected in
various urban and rural settings, including
alongside local institutions such as government
buildings and administrative offices.
These physical changes have increased the UN’s
environmental footprint. The growing demand
resulting from a mission’s arrival challenges the
capacity of local infrastructure, which is usually
weak and often already overwhelmed. At the same
time, major supply routes can be hard for missions
to access, as they often operate in hard-to-reach
areas and in landlocked countries.21 This, combined
with stresses such as protracted conflicts, long
periods of drought, and rapid population growth,
as well as a lack of local expertise, result in a
massive influx of materials and know-how into
peacekeeping areas.22 According to data collected in
2016, field missions were responsible for more than
half of the total greenhouse gas emissions of the
entire UN system (see Tables 1 and 2).23
Moreover, UN peace operations are often
deployed in fragile urban and rural environments.
They unfold on a large scale in hundreds of cities,
towns, and villages around the world, becoming
long-term features of the local environment.
Military bases, camps, super-camps, airfields,
headquarters, and logistics hubs are planned,
constructed, and deployed by the UN inside and
next to populated areas. For example, in 2016, UN
peace operations were present in more than 170
municipalities in Africa, with a combined popula-
tion of 31 million.24 These inhabited areas are often
21  In November 2017, 66 percent of peacekeeping personnel were working in landlocked or hard-to-reach areas. UN Field Support, DFS Environment Strategy,
“Executive Summary,” November 2017 p. 3, available at https://peacekeeping.un.org/sites/default/files/171116_dfs_exec_summary_environment_0.pdf .
22   Shoshan, BLUE: The Architecture of UN Peacekeeping, pp. 6–17.
23   This is the latest available data, from the UN’s annual measurement in 2017. UNEP, Greening the Blue Report 2017.
24   Shoshan, BLUE: The Architecture of UN Peacekeeping, pp. 6–17. See also UN Geospatial Information Section website
www.un.org/Depts/Cartographic/english/htmain.htm .
25   Field missions refer to peacekeeping operations, special political missions, and support missions. These figures include emissions resulting from the use of armored
vehicles. They do not include emissions from freight, but DFS is currently in discussions to see if it will be possible to include contractors’ emissions in the future.
UNEP, Greening the Blue Report 2017.
26   This first inventory has been completed without the participation of all missions. Proxies have been used to assess the average waste per capita. Ibid.
Table 1. UN field missions’ greenhouse gas emissions in 201625
Number of
personnel
(#)
Field
missions
UN system
124,683
264,221
1,051,771
1,896,199
8.44
7.18
Total
emissions
(tCO2eq)
Per capita
emissions
(tCO2eq/
personnel)
Facilities
Share of total emissions (%)
Other
travel
Air
travel
32 14 54 377.94
42 12 46 104.81
Facilities-related
emissions
intensity
(kgCO2eq/m2)
Table 2. UN field missions’ waste in 201626
Waste per
capita
(kg/person/
annum)
Reused/
recycled/
composted/
recovered (%)
Incinerated
closed (%)
Incinerated
open (%)
Landfilled
(%)
Controlled
disposal
(%)
Other (%)
Field
missions
Total
(UN-wide)
677
554
25
30
9
10
11
7
9
11
33
30
13
12
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poorly planned and built in zones exposed to
natural hazards, making them vulnerable to
droughts and floods. Such pressures intensify with
the effects of climate change and rapid population
growth. In rural areas, too, peace operations often
intervene in fragile environments threatened by
desertification, over-exploitation of natural
resources, and climate variability.
Yet despite these challenges, peace operations are
driven by political and security considerations
rather than logistical or environmental ones.
Mission personnel often have little regard for the
local context and are poorly trained in environ-
mental and urban management. Furthermore,
peacekeeping operations increasingly intervene in
multidimensional conflict settings that lead them
to militarize and to fortify their bases, further
expanding their physical footprint and isolating
them from the local context. Missions operate as
self-sustaining islands, allowing peacekeepers
direct access to resources such as water, electricity,
food, and medical services.27
As a result of these emerging problems, DFS and
DPKO are receiving a growing number of requests
to address environmental issues. Such concerns
have also been highlighted in the debriefing reports
of environmental officers, the UN personnel in
charge of environmental issues within DFS and in
field missions. These reports have emphasized both
the growing environmental footprint of missions
and the potential negative effects on missions’
mandates. For example, a former environmental
officer in the UN Stabilization Mission in the
Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO)
emphasized the severe risks to the organization’s
image if it does not adequately manage its environ-
mental impact.28
The UN is mainly interested in the ecological
impact of its peace operations due its reputation
and its relationship with local populations. Indeed,
UN peacekeeping operations often face criticism
from host countries, generally for two main
reasons. First, their waste and wastewater manage-
ment is under scrutiny, especially since the cholera
outbreak in Haiti. There are often extreme differ-
ences between UN bases and local populations in
terms of consumption and waste production
patterns. For example, the average Malian
generates 237.3 kilograms of waste per year, while a
UN peacekeeper produces 677 kilograms per year.29
In other words, a peacekeeper produces about three
times more waste than a Malian, which can signifi-
cantly influence the local environment. It also
means that a mission of 15,000 peacekeepers
produces about 11,000 tons of solid waste a year,
not including waste resulting from the use of
ammunition, the development and changing state
of the land used by the UN bases, water use, and
emissions.
Second, peacekeepers are often blamed for their
use of resources. For example, the UN–African
Union Mission in Darfur (UNAMID) and humani-
tarian actors dramatically increased demand for
water and wood in the region, leading to deforesta-
tion, which became “a source of tension with local
communities.”30 In fragile environments, resources
are often scarce, and governance systems may be
weak and unresponsive to local needs. This scarcity
of and unequal access to resources and land often
lie at the very center of the conflicts UN
peacekeepers are mandated to manage. The
deployment and presence of UN peace operations
put stress on and obstruct local ecosystems, leaving
the surrounding communities to feel the burden of
sharing their limited resources with the
peacekeepers.31
If UN missions are not environmentally respon-
sible, they face three main consequences. First, the
ecological degradation resulting from UN activities
affects their reception by local communities and
jeopardizes the organization’s legitimacy. Second,
environmental damage caused by UN missions has
a safety and security dimension, since it can be a
source of tension between the UN and the host
community, as well as within local communities,
which can hamper the implementation of the
27  Shoshan and Szita, “Reimagining the Peacekeeping Mission.”
28  Maertens, “Quand les Casques bleus passent au vert,” pp. 61–62.
29  See Global Footprint Network, available at http://data.footprintnetwork.org/#/compareCountries?type=EFCpc&cn=undefined&yr=2013 ; UNEP Greening the Blue
Report 2017: The UN System’s Environmental Footprint and Efforts to Reduce It, 2016, available at
http://www.greeningtheblue.org/sites/default/files/Greening%20the%20Blue%20report%202017%20-%20Brochure%20(web%20-%20low%20res).pdf .
30  UNEP, Greening the Blue Helmets, p. 21.
31  Shoshan and Szita, “Reimagining the Peacekeeping Mission.”
overall mandate of the mission. Third, ecological
damage can have long-term consequences for
ecosystems and communities, even years after a
mission closes down, from waste resulting from the
use of plastic bottles, to the depletion of subter-
ranean water reserves in arid areas, to the overall
carbon footprint of missions due to air travel and
transport.
DEBATES OVER ENVIRONMENTAL
ISSUES AT THE SECURITY COUNCIL
The Security Council has regularly discussed
environmental issues since the late 1990s. It has
repeatedly examined the link between the environ-
ment and conflict, first approaching this issue
through the lens of the exploitation of natural
resources. It adopted a series of sanctions on
certain commodities, such as timber and
diamonds, and mandated peacekeepers to directly
or indirectly address natural resources (e.g.,
supervision of the logging moratorium in
Cambodia, support for policies to prevent illegal
trade in natural resources in the Democratic
Republic of the Congo, oversight of oil infrastruc-
ture in Sudan and South Sudan). In 2005, it
adopted Resolution 1625, which recognized the
potential contribution of high-value natural
resources “to the outbreak, escalation or continua-
tion of armed conflict.”32 In 2007, UN member
states agreed on a presidential statement
concluding the first debate on natural resources
and conflicts. In this statement, they highlighted
the role of UN peacekeeping operations in the
restoration of natural resource management
systems.33 According to UNEP’s 2012 report,
member states also requested several missions to
invest in issues related to natural resources,
including the missions in Angola, Cambodia, Côte
d’Ivoire, the Democratic Republic of the Congo,
Iraq-Kuwait, Liberia, Sierra Leone, Sudan, Abyei,
Darfur, South Sudan, and Timor-Leste.34 In 2013,
natural resources were again on the agenda, but
member states did not reach consensus for a
general resolution on natural resources and
conflict.35 As a result, instead of a systematic
approach, member states have opted for a case-by-
case approach to environmental issues.
However, putting climate change on the agenda
of the Security Council is extremely controversial.
Strong divisions have emerged among Security
Council members, most clearly in 2007 and 2011,
when they discussed the security implications of
climate change. They have also mainly only consid-
ered these issues during informal meetings (Arria
formula) or indirectly as a topic related to the main
discussion (e.g., on water and peace, small island
developing states, or even conflict prevention).
Nevertheless, an increasing number of states, both
from the Global North and the Global South, are
advocating for greater consideration of climate
threats.36
Regarding UN peace operations’ environmental
footprint, the Security Council has been slow in
taking the issue on board. As discussed later, some
member states have been vocally opposed to
stricter policies and environmental standards for
peacekeeping operations. As a result, they have
included environmental concerns in peace
operations’ mandates only since 2013 (and still not
systematically), starting with MINUSMA.
However, besides member states’ support in
other arenas—the General Assembly’s Special
Committee on Peacekeeping Operations (C34),
Advisory Committee on Administrative and
Budgetary Questions, and Fifth Committee—two
recent initiatives in the Security Council also show
growing interest in environmental matters. Despite
much debate among member states, the Security
Council released a press statement on the environ-
mental management of peacekeeping operations in
December 2017.37 Even though press statements are
not legally binding, they can create incentives and
conditions for further discussions. In addition, a
“Group of Friends Leading on Environmental
Management in the Field,” co-chaired by
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32  UN Security Council Resolution 1625 (September 14, 2005), UN Doc. S/RES/1625.
33  UN Security Council, Statement by the President of the Security Council, UN Doc. S/PRST/2007/22, June 25, 2007.
34  UNEP, Greening the Blue Helmets, pp. 84–99. See also Philippe Le Billon, “Bankrupting Peace Spoilers: Can Peacekeepers Curtail Belligerents’ Access to Resource
Revenues?,” in High-Value Natural Resources and Peacebuilding, Päivi Lujala and Siri Aas Rustad, eds. (London: Earthscan, 2012).
35  UN Security Council, 6982nd Meeting, UN Doc. S/PV.6982, June 19, 2003.
36  Lucile Maertens, “Le changement climatique en débat au Conseil de sécurité de l’ONU,” Revue internationale et stratégique 1, no. 109 (2018).
37  This text was initially meant to be a presidential statement, but member states were unable to reach consensus. The text was therefore “downgraded” to a press
statement.
Bangladesh and Italy, has recently been created to
advocate for further implementation of DFS’s
Environment Strategy for UN peace operations.
UN Peace Operations’
Environmental Approach
Growing attention to potential environmental
damage caused by the UN has led to calls for the
conceptualization and implementation of an
environmental strategy for UN peace operations.
This includes environmental policies and
guidelines produced since the late 2000s, DFS’s
Environment Strategy, training material and staff
dedicated to environmental affairs, and small-scale
projects that can highlight best practices.
ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY AND
GUIDELINES
On April 25, 2013, in the resolution that established
the new peacekeeping operation in Mali
(MINUSMA), the UN Security Council called for
an assessment of the effects of the mission on the
environment, requesting “the Secretary-General to
consider the environmental impacts of the
operations of MINUSMA when fulfilling its
mandated tasks and, in this context, encouraging
MINUSMA to manage them, as appropriate.”38 For
the first time, a UN peacekeeping operation
received a direct mandate to address the environ-
mental consequences of its activities. Since then,
the Security Council has also requested four other
missions to consider and manage their environ-
mental footprint: UNAMID (in 2013), the UN
Support Office in Somalia (UNSOS, in 2015),
MONUSCO, and MINUSCA (both in 2017).
These mandates came in parallel with a series of
measures DPKO and DFS have taken to reduce the
environmental impacts of their operations (see
Figure 1). In 2009, DPKO and DFS adopted their
Environmental Policy for UN Field Missions.39
Various previous initiatives prepared them for the
adoption of this policy, which was initially drafted
with the support of UNEP. According to a former
staff member of DPKO, one position dedicated to
the environment was first created within the
Engineering Section at UN headquarters to suggest
guidelines and environmental standards.40
However, standards had yet to be officially institu-
tionalized. He also mentioned a series of interven-
tions from 2004 to 2005 focusing on sanitary
conditions and the treatment of wastewater in field
missions. In line with the secretary-general’s push
toward a climate neutral UN, a first draft of the
Environmental Policy was sent to all DPKO and
DFS senior staff in 2007. It took two years before it
was officially adopted, following questions over the
legal obligations it would commit the UN to.
Concentrating mostly on the practices and
behaviors of UN peacekeepers, the 2009
Environmental Policy deals with the following
topics: solid and hazardous waste; energy; water
and wastewater management; wild animals and
plants; and cultural and historic sites. Effective
since June 1, 2009, it requires each operation to
establish an environmental policy—an environ-
mental baseline study, an environmental action
plan, and an emergency preparedness plan, with
objectives and control measures—and to appoint
an environmental officer. It also requires all
employees to follow its recommendations as well as
those of the environmental guidelines that
accompany it, which are available to UN staff on
the DPKO/DFS intranet. According to DPKO and
DFS, the policy both aims to reduce environmental
impact and to improve the health and safety of UN
staff and local communities.
Subsequently, the secretary-general brought up
the environmental footprint of peace operations in
his 2010 report on the Global Field Support
Strategy.41 On several occasions since 2011,
member states in the General Assembly (the
Second and Fifth Committees and the C34)42 and in
the Security Council have requested the implemen-
tation of sound environmental practices, promoted
the mitigation of the environmental impact of UN
peacekeeping operations, and mandated missions
to strengthen their efforts in these areas.43 For
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38  UN Security Council Resolution 2100 (April 25, 2013), UN Doc. S/RES/2100.
39  UN DPKO and DFS, Environmental Policy for UN Field Missions, UN Doc. PK/G/2009.06, May 31, 2009.
40  Interview with former DPKO official, New York, February 2013.
41  UN General Assembly, Global Field Support Strategy: Report of the Secretary-General, UN Doc. A/64/633, January 26, 2010.
42  Support in the Fifth Committee is especially important since its decisions provide the basis for peacekeeping budgets approved in the General Assembly.
43  Maertens, “Quand les Casques bleus passent au vert,” p. 66.
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Figure 1. UN peace operations and the environment: Stepping stones
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instance, the Security Council’s 2017 press
statement on the environmental management of
peacekeeping operations states:
The members of the Security Council were cognizant
of the possible environmental impact of peace keeping
operations mandated by the Security Council. They
underscored the importance that peacekeeping
operations endeavor to minimize their impact on the
sustainability of the ecosystems where they are
deployed, based on sound consideration of the risks,
benefits and costs.
They acknowledged that “the modalities in which
peacekeeping operations interact with the environ-
ment where they are deployed may contribute to
the effective and efficient delivery of their
mandates.” They also “underlined the importance
to address comprehensively the environmental
impact of peacekeeping operations, in close coordi-
nation with the relevant parties involved,” being
mindful of the environmental goals set out in
global agreements such as the Paris Agreement on
climate change.44
Since 2015, environmental management has
become a priority for DFS. That year, it adopted a
Waste Management Policy for UN Field Missions.
At the beginning of 2016, an Environment Section
dedicated to environmental management was
created in the Office of the Under-Secretary-
General for Field Support. The section developed
DFS’s Environment Strategy in consultation “with
missions, HQ actors and relevant partners.”45
Officially released in November 2016, the strategy
is divided into two phases. The first focuses on
setting baseline data for June 2020. The second
aspires to the following vision for June 2023:
“responsible missions that achieve maximum
efficiency in their use of natural resources and
operate at a minimum risk to people, societies and
ecosystems; contributing to a positive impact on
these whenever possible.”46 It provides a precise
timetable (see Figure 2) and performance indica-
tors for five pillars: energy, water and wastewater,
solid waste, wider impact, and the introduction of
an environmental management system.47
To implement the Environment Strategy,
missions use a standard template to develop their
environmental action plan through data collection
and budget planning. By November 2017, each
mission had a mission-wide environmental action
plan for the 2017/2018 budgetary cycle.48 For the first
time, member states also agreed on a set of fourteen
key performance indicators for all missions,
including one indicator on environmental issues. By
setting common indicators for all missions, this
decision supports the creation of an environmental
performance management system. DFS’s
Environment Section is also developing a method-
ology to assess the wider environmental impact and
is working with missions to monitor waste and
collect reliable data on energy and water consump-
tion to provide more accurate baseline data.
Environmental management policies are
constantly being updated to meet environmental
challenges while being disseminated in key
documents, such as in specific manuals like the
forthcoming revised Liquidation Manual.49 The
Environment Strategy is considered to be “a living
document, updated as progress is made and
approaches evolve.”50 DFS’s Environ ment Section,
current missions, and the UN Global Service
Centre in Brindisi are working on its implementa-
tion, with DFS recognizing that there is still “a long
way to go.”51
ENVIRONMENTAL STAFF IN
HEADQUARTERS AND MISSIONS AND
TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE
The implementation of environmental policies
relies on both human and financial resources. Since
2009, the number of staff dedicated to environ-
44  UN Security Council, Press Statement on Environmental Management of Peacekeeping Operations, UN Doc. SC/13134-ENV/DEV/1830-PKO/700, December 21,
2017.
45  UN Field Support, DFS Environment Strategy, “Executive Summary,” April 2017, p. 1.
46  Ibid.
47  Like in the Environmental Policy, this pillar includes issues around the protection of cultural heritage. For more information, see Mathilde Leloup, “La Résolution
2011 ou l’inscription du patrimoine culturel au mandat d’une opération de paix,” Réseau de recherche sur les opérations de paix, May 25, 2016, available at
www.operationspaix.net/97-dossier-du-rop-la-resolution-2100-ou-linscription-du-patrimoine-culturel-au-mandat-dune-operation-de-paix.html .
48  UN Field Support, Progress So Far: DFS Environment Strategy, November 2017, p. 1, available at
https://peacekeeping.un.org/sites/default/files/171116_progress_so_far.pdf .
49  Ibid.
50  UN Field Support, DFS Environment Strategy, “Executive Summary,” November 2017, p. 1.
51  UN Field Support, DFS Environment Strategy, “Executive Summary,” April 2017, p. 1.
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Figure 2. Timeline for DFS’s Environment Strategy
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52  Maertens, “Quand les Casques bleus passent au vert,” p. 64.
53  Interviews with DFS, New York, March 2018.
54  Interview with officials from DFS Environment Section, New York, March 2018.
55  Ibid.
56  UN Field Support, DFS Environment Strategy, “Executive Summary,” November 2017, p. 1.
57  UN Field Support, Progress So Far: DFS Environment Strategy, “Executive Summary,” November 2017, p. 1.
mental issues has increased both at headquarters
and in missions, including with the support of
external technical assistance.
Environmental officers, as key actors in raising
awareness, support the development of UN peace
operations’ environmental practices. In parallel
with the creation of the 2009 Environmental Policy,
in the late 2000s, DFS appointed an environmental
officer in charge of coordinating efforts to reduce
the environmental footprint of UN peacekeeping
operations and raise broader awareness of the
environment among peacekeepers. Nominated
before the adoption of the Environmental Policy,
the environmental officer position was integrated
into DFS’s Logistics Support Division (first within
the Engineering Section, then in the Office of the
Director), with approval by the General Assembly.
Several activities were assigned to the officer
before the creation of the entire Environment
Section in 2016: (1) management of the informa-
tion to be disseminated on the intranet and on the
website; (2) circulation of the Environmental
Policy within headquarters and dissemination of
environmental guidelines and publications; (3)
presentation of the results of the implementation of
the Environmental Policy to member states; and (4)
management of a community of practice,
established to facilitate exchanges among staff and
environmental officers serving in operations.52
Human resources are unevenly shared among
missions (see Figure 3). As of January 2018, ten
missions had a unit entirely dedicated to environ-
mental issues, under different labels: “Environment
and Occupational Health and Safety” (MINUSCA,
UNSOS), “Environment” (MINUJUSTH,
MINUSMA, UNISFA, UNMIL), “Environmental
Compliance” (UNAMID, UNMISS), “Environ -
mental Protection” (MONUSCO), and “Environ -
mental Management” (UNIFIL). Most of the units
report directly to the director or chief of mission
support. Each mission with more than 1,000
uniformed personnel has an environmental unit,
and the six missions with more than 10,000
uniformed personnel have at least two dedicated
professional staff (at P3/P4 level or national profes-
sional officers). The units also include UN
volunteers (in some cases, like MINURSO,
UNAMA and UNVMC, the UN volunteer is the
only staff member working on environmental
management).53 DFS’s Environment Section also
suggests strengthening the capacity and expertise
of engineering staff, who are distinct from environ-
mental officers,54 and recruiting waste management
officers. In headquarters, as of early 2018, the
Environment Section had three professional staff
(one P5, one P4, and one P3) and one general staff
member.
In addition to monitoring the implementation of
and disseminating the Environmental Policy,
environmental officers at headquarters and in the
field have two additional functions. First, they
symbolically demonstrate that DFS takes the
environmental impact of its operations seriously.
Second, they ensure the visibility of the mission’s
environmental footprint to senior management
and facilitate the implementation of environmental
projects in the field: they conduct inspections,
promote mainstreaming environmental policies
into operations conducted by missions, advise
other sections, and organize training and
awareness-raising campaigns for field personnel.55
They also form a network of experts on peace
operations and environmental practices and
interact in the working groups’ “set up to develop
detailed operational plans across each of the five
pillars” of the Environment Strategy. These
working groups bring together mission staff
through voluntary monthly video conferences, in
which an average of eleven missions participate.56
To supplement UN staff in missions, technical
assistance is provided by three means. First, DFS’s
Environment Section provides policy-related
information to all missions, including a series of
advisory notes addressing waste management and
disposal issues (see Figure 4).57 Second, since July
2017, the Global Service Centre in Brindisi has had
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an Environmental Technical Support Unit with a
team of engineers to support missions in techni-
cally implementing the Environment Strategy.
Third, in June 2016, DFS and UNEP launched the
Rapid Environment and Climate Technical
Assistance Facility (REACT), which recruited eight
professionals in engineering and the environment
to provide technical assistance to headquarters and
missions. As of November 2017, it had conducted
fifteen on-the-ground visits and had provided
technical support on several occasions (see Table
3).58 For instance, together with the Global Service
Centre, the REACT partnership brought technical
assistance on hazardous waste disposal to the UN
missions in Haiti (MINUSTAH) and Côte d’Ivoire
(ONUCI) during their liquidation process.59
TRAINING OF TROOPS AND UN
PERSONNEL
In its 2012 report, UNEP recommended
integrating environmental issues into pre-deploy-
ment and on-arrival field training.60 Indeed, the
development of DFS’s 2017 Environment Strategy
relied on training material, along with the recruit-
ment of environmental officers at headquarters and
in field missions.
The training of UN peacekeeping staff and troops
serving in operations is the responsibility of both
DPKO/DFS and the member states providing the
troops.61 In 2013, the Integrated Training Service
(shared between DPKO and DFS) appeared
reluctant to integrate environmental issues into
training programs. The service’s director
highlighted a form of saturation: the organization
could not provide training on everything, and the
environment was not seen as a priority and was
considered more a matter of awareness raising than
training.62
Nevertheless, the 2017 Core Pre-deployment
Training Materials, available in the UN
Peacekeeping Resource Hub, include a lesson in
Module 3 dedicated to “Environment and Natural
Resources.”63 This lesson integrates questions of
missions’ environmental impact and environ-
mental footprint and issues related to the role of
58  UN Field Support, DFS Environment Strategy, “Executive Summary,” November 2017, p. 4.
59  UN Field Support, Progress So Far: DFS Environment Strategy, November 2017, p. 1.
60  UNEP, Greening the Blue Helmets, p. 82.
61  Interview with official from DPKO/DFS’s Integrated Training Service, New York, February 2013.
62  Interview with official from DPKO/DFS’s Division for Policy, Evaluation and Training, New York, February 2013.
63  See http://research.un.org/revisedcptm2017 .
64  UN Field Support, Progress So Far: DFS Environment Strategy, November 2017, p. 1. 
Table 3. Technical assistance to UN missions through REACT (2017)64
natural resources in conflict and peacebuilding (in
line with the online training developed by UNITAR
and the International Institute for Sustainable
Development with the support of UNEP and
DPKO/DFS based on UNEP’s report Greening the
Blue Helmets).
Even if it is too early to evaluate the outcomes of
the recent inclusion of this lesson, it is worth
mentioning that its application in training for
military personnel is the responsibility of each
troop- and police-contributing country. DFS
advises these countries and provides resources—
including manuals and PowerPoint presentations
for pre-deployment training—but has little power
to assess their implementation. Even states that see
benefit in training their soldiers on environmental
issues may not have the necessary resources and
expertise or may not see it as a priority. Raising
awareness of environmental issues is at the discre-
tion of each troop- and police-contributing
country.
Nevertheless, in the press statement published in
December 2017, the members of the Security
Council
encouraged Member States to incorporate, as
appropriate, environmental guidelines into their
national training programs for military and police
personnel in preparation for deployment to United
Nations Peacekeeping Operations. They further
requested the Secretary-General to continue to ensure
that civilian personnel deployed in peacekeeping
operations receive similar training.65
This decision came after the 2016 recommenda-
tions by the UN Board of Auditors on the need for
pre-deployment environmental training for
military personnel and for the appointment of
military environmental advisers.66
The UN has also considered developing specific
training on particular topics, such as wastewater
management or country-specific environmental
challenges. The November 2017 executive summary
of DFS’s Environment Strategy stated that
“increased emphasis will be placed on awareness-
raising and behavioral change for both UN staff and
military and police contingents with training
becoming mandatory in some areas, and additional
materials and guidance developed where needed.”67
These trainings could focus on both technical skills
and specific topics, such as waste and wastewater
management, as well as contextual elements, such as
the urban dynamics in which peacekeepers operate
or local modes of managing natural resources. As
part of their planning and design processes, it is
paramount that missions recruit well-trained
environmental officers, waste management officers,
spatial planners, and engineers working on environ-
mental matters such as energy, water, sanitation,
and waste. It is also necessary that missions have the
capacity to incorporate local construction practices
when possible and consider local cultures and to
operate mindfully in the vicinity of cultural and
historical sites.
Training modules for UN troops and personnel
in specific areas can improve current practices as
well as the lasting impacts of missions on local
communities and the environment. Acknow -
ledging that there should be more work done in this
area, DFS’s Environment Section is in the process
of hiring an expert on communication and training
through REACT.68
BEST PRACTICES AND LESSONS
LEARNED FROM SMALL-SCALE
PROJECTS
UNEP’s 2012 report mentions a series of success
stories, or illustrative examples, to show the
concrete activities implemented to reduce UN
peace operations’ environmental footprint. They
are mostly small-scale projects meant to highlight
lessons learned and best practices. UNEP supports
these actions through the REACT partnership,
which provides staff and technical assistance.69
Multiple success stories were also identified in
interviews conducted as part of a separate study.70
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65  UN Security Council, Press Statement on Environmental Management of Peacekeeping Operations, UN Doc. SC/13134-ENV/DEV/1830-PKO/700, December 21,
2017.
66  UN General Assembly, Financial Report and Audited Financial Statements for the 12-Month Period from 1 July 2015 to 30 June 2016 and Report of the Board of
Auditors, UN Doc. A/71/5 (Vol. II), January 20, 2017.
67  UN Field Support, DFS Environment Strategy, “Executive Summary,” November 2017, p. 2
68  Interview with officials from DFS Environment Section, New York, March 2018.
69  UN Field Support, DFS Environment Strategy, “Executive Summary,” April 2017, p. 1.
70  Lucile Maertens, “From Green to Blue: Securitization of the Environment within the United Nations” (original title in French: “Quand le Bleu passe au vert: La
sécurisation de l’environnement à l’ONU”), (PhD diss., Sciences Po Paris and University of Geneva, 2015).
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In Haiti and Kosovo, missions operating in existing
urban environments implemented waste and
pollution management plans both for themselves
and for the community. Broader activities related
to resource management have been undertaken by
the missions in Darfur, Haiti, and Western Sahara.
Likewise, several missions participated in a
reforestation campaign, regularly mentioned in
interviews, and in “clean-up” events.71
Although they may seem anecdotal, activities
undertaken as part of quick impact projects (QIPs)
can also contribute to the implementation of DFS’s
Environment Strategy, capacity building, and
community empowerment.72 For instance, in Haiti,
among the 1,782 projects conducted by
MINUSTAH from 2004 to 2017, 68 were dedicated
to the protection of the environment, and 463 to
water, health, and sanitation.73 In many missions,
small-scale projects were also implemented as part
of the Environment Strategy’s “wider impact”
pillar. These projects “aimed at environmental
improvement, ranging from tree planting to
awareness raising to clean-up events involving
staff.”74 For example, the missions in Côte d’Ivoire
and the Democratic Republic of the Congo worked
on restoration and community projects, respec-
tively.
In a four-page document entitled Environmental
Good Practice, published in November 2017, DFS
lists a series of environmental good practices under
each pillar of the Environment Strategy.75 In terms
of energy, while fifteen missions use solar energy at
least partially, renewable energy supplies less than
0.1 percent of the total energy consumed. The UN
71  UN Field Support, Progress So Far: DFS Environment Strategy, November 2017, p. 3.
72  Quick impact projects are small-scale projects planned and implemented over a short period of time and with a reduced budget.
73  The focus on water, health, and sanitation also resulted from the cholera outbreak. Interview with MINUSTAH’s civil affairs team, Port-au-Prince, April 26, 2017.
74  UN Field Support, Progress So Far: DFS Environment Strategy, November 2017, p. 1.
75  DFS, Environmental Good Practice: 2017 Implementation of the DFS Environment Strategy in Field Missions, November 2017, p. 3, available at
https://peacekeeping.un.org/sites/default/files/171117_environmental_strategy_good_practices.pdf .
Members of the Indonesian Formed Police Unit working with the AU/UN Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID) plant trees outside
UNAMID headquarters, El Fasher, Sudan, June 5, 2012. UN Photo/Albert González Farran
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Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP) and
UNMISS are currently implementing projects to
reduce energy demand and costs. Similarly,
MINUSMA has made a small-scale investment in
pilot technology combining wind and solar energy,
UNIFIL and the UN Assistance Mission for Iraq
(UNAMI) have developed energy management
programs, and UNMIK has worked to reduce
energy consumption in its vehicle fleet.
In terms of water and wastewater, UN peace
operations have purchased more than 400
wastewater treatment plants. In Darfur, for
example, wastewater recycling covered 40 percent
of the mission’s water needs in 2014 and 2015.
UNMISS and MINUSCA also have programs to
treat wastewater and minimize risks associated
with the formation of standing water. And
MINUSTAH reduced its solid waste by more than
10 percent in 2015 and 2016.76 On solid waste, the
example of MINUSTAH is presented as “a lesson
for all other missions that it is better to start early
when it comes to hazardous waste management.”77
Likewise, according to DFS, MINUSMA’s initiative
takes root in the “lessons learned from previous
waste management experiences with local
solutions.”78
From such success stories, DFS collects and
disseminates best practices and lessons learned.
These both guide the action of the organization and
legitimize its activities.79 DPKO and DFS’s Division
for Policy, Evaluation and Training has a team
dedicated to collecting these lessons learned and
best practices in the field. However, the collection
system faces multiple weaknesses, especially in
collecting those from the support side of missions.
Environmental best practices are disseminated in
four different ways. First, documents and relevant
material are available “to technical staff from all
missions on the online COSMOS site that has been
established to support information sharing in the
implementation of the DFS Environment
Strategy.”80 Documents such as the summary of
good practices mentioned earlier can be circulated
on this site.
Second, staff in missions have the opportunity to
share their own experiences in the working groups
for each pillar. These task-oriented working groups
support the implementation of DFS’s Environment
Strategy. They are chaired by mission directors and
chiefs of mission support and consist of personnel
from field missions and headquarters and staff
provided through REACT. These working groups
“have been set up to develop detailed operational
plans across each of the five pillars above, with
quarterly review of progress.”81
Third, missions conduct campaigns to
mainstream environmental management into their
work. For instance, the UN Mission for the
Referendum in Western Sahara (MINURSO)
organized a week-long awareness campaign “giving
personnel the opportunity to learn about recycling
and the need to minimize vehicle idling.” As
another example, “UNMIL is mainstreaming
environmental management across the mission,
under the guidance of the Green Working Group,
composed of personnel from all levels.”82 Likewise,
MINUSMA’s environmental unit created a poster
in English and French to raise awareness of eco-
friendly practices among the mission’s personnel
(see Figure 4).
Fourth, good practices are spread more
informally through the circulation of UN
personnel, the commitment of key individuals, and
the diffusion of illustrative examples.
Since the end of the 2000s, DPKO and DFS have
been developing an environmental approach for
UN peace operations in line with broader environ-
mental campaigns advocated within the UN system.
Small-scale projects show the emergence of
environmental practices implemented both to
minimize the risks of environmental damage and to
proactively protect the environment or reduce its
76  UN Field Support, Progress So Far: DFS Environment Strategy, November 2017, pp. 2–3.
77  UN Field Support, Environmental Good Practice, November 2017, p. 3.
78  Ibid.
79  Asmara Klein, Camille Laporte, and Marie Saiget, eds., Les bonnes pratiques des organisations internationales (Paris: Presses de la Fondation nationale des sciences
politiques, 2015), p. 31.
80  UN Field Support, Environmental Good Practice, November 2017, p. 4.
81  UN Field Support, DFS Environment Strategy, “Executive Summary,” November 2017, p. 4.
82  UN Field Support, Environmental Good Practice, November 2017, p. 4.
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Figure 4. Poster for raising awareness on the environment in MINUSMA
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83  Joel van der Beek, “A Speculative Financial and Socio-economic Model for Evaluating and Enhancing International Peacekeeping Missions,” in BLUE: The
Architecture of UN Peacekeeping, pp. 42–43.
84  Shoshan, BLUE: The Architecture of UN Peacekeeping, pp. 6–17.
85  Van der Beek, “A Speculative Financial and Socio-economic Model for Evaluating and Enhancing International Peacekeeping Missions,” pp. 42–43.
86  Maertens, “From Green to Blue: Securitization of the Environment within the United Nations.”
87  Maertens, “Quand les Casques bleus passent au vert,” p. 71.
ongoing degradation. Yet the environmental
footprint of UN peace operations still puts signifi-
cant pressure on ecosystems and local communities.
Limits and Constraints
While peace operations have a considerable degree
of flexibility, they also face numerous limits and
constraints that have been slowing down the
process of greening UN peace operations. This is
why it took a number of years to define and
approve a comprehensive environmental strategy,
with almost ten years between the first draft of the
Environmental Policy, finally adopted in 2009, and
the launch of DFS’s Environment Strategy at the
end of 2016. There are three main reasons for these
limited outcomes: (1) uneven implementation of
the Environment Strategy among missions; (2)
difficulty in ensuring oversight from UN headquar-
ters; and (3) the politics of sourcing and procure-
ment.
UNEVEN IMPLEMENTATION OF THE
ENVIRONMENT STRATEGY
Missions unevenly implement UN environmental
policies and guidelines. The implementation of the
Environment Strategy is uneven due to numerous
disparities among missions in terms of staff alloca-
tion, budget, equipment, local circumstances, and
senior leadership. Each mission receives a different
budget according to its mandate and tasks, and not
every mission has leadership that recognizes the
risks of not integrating environmental considera-
tions into daily operations, including the potential
for more backlash and higher costs in the long term
(e.g., due to compensation claims for environ-
mental damage).
Moreover, each operation includes troops from
different countries and cultures, who come with
materials, equipment, and goods with varying
environmental and life-style standards. These
differences are manifested in missions’ environ-
mental footprint. On the one hand, a UN base
deployed by wealthier countries generates a larger
long-term environmental footprint than one
deployed by less wealthy nations. As wealthier
countries bring more equipment and resources
into mission areas to support the quality of life of
their troops (such as larger and more equipped
modular structures for dwelling that require more
energy to maintain leisure spaces, gyms, and
canteens) and the efficiency of the mission (such as
munitions, vehicles, and telecommunications
equipment).83 The differences can be identified in
the spatial organization, deployment, and use of
land and equipment.84 On the other hand, wealthier
countries can purchase more eco-friendly materials
and invest more in improving local capacity.85
Because of such disparities, models that are
successful in one mission cannot be reproduced in
all contexts. For example, in an independent
investigation conducted in 2013, UN staff in New
York mentioned the UN Interim Force in Lebanon
(UNIFIL) as an example to follow in terms of
efforts to reduce peace operations’ environmental
footprint.86 Yet the troops supplying UNIFIL often
originate from richer countries with more eco-
friendly materials and larger budgets to purchase
waste-management supplies. Moreover, the
mission has access to adequate local infrastructure
and can focus on improving camps set up decades
ago.
Furthermore, local circumstances differ from one
operation to another. The model status of forces
agreement commits host governments to helping
missions obtain and make available water,
sewerage, electricity, and other facilities for free or,
when that is not possible, at the most favorable
rates. However, host countries are sometimes
reluctant to let peacekeepers use their natural
resources, which they can perceive as interference
with their natural resource management. The
reality is that UN peace operations often lack
accessible, practical, and safe options for disposing
of wastewater and solid waste, and importing
necessary equipment or using international
contractors is often expensive.87 Aside from these
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disparities, the UN’s internal evaluation system still
requires improvement to fully ensure the uniform
implementation of DFS’s Environment Strategy.
DIFFICULTY IN ENSURING OVERSIGHT
FROM HEADQUARTERS
The lack of standardization also results from
difficulty in ensuring oversight inside missions and
from UN headquarters, as the oversight system
used by headquarters to verify the implementation
of its policies at the field level is still incomplete.
However, the recent introduction of a performance
and risk management framework to report detailed
data from each mission should, in the long run,
improve this situation, which past audits and
evaluations have deplored.
In September 2012, following an audit of UN
peacekeeping operations’ waste management
systems, the UN Office of Internal Oversight
Services (OIOS) reported to the Secretariat that it
considered the monitoring system to be “unsatisfac-
tory.”88 Between 2014 and 2015, OIOS audited waste
management in seven UN peacekeeping operations.
In 2015, more than four years after the cholera
outbreak in Haiti, OIOS concluded that “the
MINUSTAH governance, risk management and
control processes examined were initially assessed
as unsatisfactory in providing reasonable assurance
regarding the effective management of waste in
MINUSTAH.”89 In 2016, the office assessed DFS’s
guidance and oversight of wastewater management
in peacekeeping operations as “partially satisfac-
tory.”90 These audits not only helped identify
shortcomings in the oversight system but also
provided recommendations for improving
missions’ environmental performance.
This limited oversight results from the lack of a
consistent system for collecting comprehensive
data and making it accessible. DFS’s Environment
Strategy intends to build systems to collect “more
robust data” with “consistent methodologies for
site assessments.”91 For instance, energy efficiency
can be improved by meters measuring both
production and consumption to verify that genera-
tors run at their highest achievable efficiencies, as
in UNIFIL, where synchronized generators help to
monitor all energy output.92
In November 2017, however, DFS acknowledged
that the baseline data used to set up the goals of its
Environment Strategy “is tentative and based on a
preliminary data collection exercise from
missions.”93 The system is short of automated tools
and resources to systematically measure perform-
ance. Data on the long-term impact of missions,
needed to strengthen efforts to improve environ-
mental sustainability even after their departure, is
also missing. Such processes of data collection and
verification are indispensable to the even
implementation of environmental policies across
missions.
Despite recent efforts to improve data collection,
the challenges facing the oversight system also
result from the gap between UN headquarters,
which decides on environmental policies, and field
missions, which are meant to implement them.
Staff members serving in UN peace operations who
are already responsible for a large number of tasks
might not have internalized these policies, and it is
difficult for headquarters to closely supervise their
implementation. While the Environmental Policy
is compulsory for all missions, there are no
penalties for noncompliance, even though it
includes a dedicated section on “standards of
conduct for personnel.” In other words, it is a
toothless policy without individual accountability
or staff members who are not performing.94
The oversight system’s difficulties also lie in
environmental issues’ ambiguous position between
substantive and support divisions. While the
negative consequences of poor environmental
management mostly affect the substantive side of
missions, especially since they impact their
relationship with local communities, support
divisions are in charge of environmental issues as
part of their tasks related to equipment and camp
88  Maertens, “Quand les Casques bleus passent au vert,” p. 71.
89  OIOS, Audit of Waste Management in the United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti, Internal Audit Division Report 2015/068, June 30, 2015, p. 2.
90  OIOS, Audit of the Department of Field Support’s Guidance and Oversight of Wastewater Management in Peacekeeping Operations, Internal Audit Division Report
2016/013, March 9, 2016.
91  UN Field Support, DFS Environment Strategy, “Executive Summary,” November 2017, p. 1.
92  UN Field Support, Environmental Good Practice, November 2017, p. 1.
93  UN Field Support, DFS Environment Strategy, “Executive Summary,” November 2017, p. 2.
94  Maertens, “Quand les Casques bleus passent au vert,” p. 73.
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management.
Shortcomings in the oversight system can lead to
“greenwashing”—displaying best practices and
success stories and using policies to show efforts
are being made while hiding or denying mistakes
and mismanagement. Indeed, according to several
UN officials, information is selectively reported,
especially from missions to headquarters.95 This
creates a vicious cycle: by not informing headquar-
ters and member states of their failures for fear of
damaging their image and relationship with local
actors, mission leaders do not obtain approval for
the compensation or funding necessary to reduce
their environmental impact.
Even though it is too early to assess the effective-
ness of the new performance management system
set up in 2017, recent efforts have aimed to address
some of these issues. Through guidelines and
training modules on data collection, UN headquar-
ters intends to improve collection of data related to
key performance indicators for the five pillars of
the Environment Strategy. Identification of data
owners (e.g., staff in charge of monitoring and
communicating data) and accountability for data
accuracy should also support systematic
monitoring of environmental performance.
POLITICS OF SOURCING AND
PROCUREMENT
The difficulty of reducing peace operations’
environmental impact also results from the politics
of sourcing and procurement. The UN’s organiza-
tional culture and member states’ preferences
shape the way peacekeeping operations are
designed and carried out.
UN peace operations are planned as short-term
operations; although the median duration of
peacekeeping missions since 2000 has been 6.5
years, their mandates are renewed each year.96
Missions are also carried out on a yearly budget.
This budgetary cycle was among the challenges
DFS identified in the implementation of its
Environmental Policy, as it encumbers long-term
investment, planning, and procurement of
materials, particularly since the financial crisis of
2007–2008 increased financial pressure from
member states. The brief and urgent timeline of
mission deployments, coupled with security
concerns, leads to the implementation of planning
procedures that leave many pressing environ-
mental concerns, such as those related to the design
of camps’ waste management infrastructure,
unplanned and unresolved. These procedures are
hard to change and continue to be applied,
especially for rapid deployments.97
Besides their initial design, the way missions are
carried out, especially in terms of procurement and
sourcing, affects their environmental impact. UN
missions primarily rely on international suppliers
and external logistics firms that shape the
landscape where missions operate and inflate their
environmental footprint. For instance, the
company Ecolog has become a leading provider of
catering, supplies, construction, technology, facility
management, and environmental services for
INUSMA, UNSOS, and other missions.98 As a
result, capacities and resources to maintain and
support UN peace operations are imported from
around the world, from modular construction
systems to food and cooks. This global flow of
commodities and expertise, which can be traced to
the UN Global Marketplace—the common
procurement platform for the UN system—is
excessively wasteful.99
Misunderstanding of or misconceptions about
local economies, as well as the lack of environ-
mental assessments at an early stage, can also lead
to environmentally damaging practices. For
instance, the bricks used to build UNAMID’s camp
and the facilities for humanitarian actors in Darfur
were bought from the local population in order to
support the local economy and promote women’s
employment, but they were baked over wood fires,
which contributed to deforestation.100 Misunder -
95    Ibid.
96    UN Field Support, DFS Environment Strategy, “Executive Summary,” November 2017, p. 3.
97    Shoshan and Szita, “Reimagining Peacekeeping Missions.”
98    Active in more than thirty-six countries and with 12,000 personnel in more than 150 locations, Ecolog supplies UN peace operations including MINUSMA (see
the fourth section). It provides “customized solutions to governments and defense, humanitarian organizations and commercial clients in the sectors of Oil &
Gas, Mining, Energy and Infrastructure projects.” See https://ecolog-international.com/en/ .
99    See www.ungm.org and .
100  UNEP, Greening the Blue Helmets, p. 21.
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standing of local economies and environmental
practices can reverse the potential benefits of
sourcing locally and even have a negative impact on
the environment and the local economy by
inflating local prices of some supplies.
Some shortcomings in the implementation of the
Environmental Policy thus result from sourcing
practices—the materials used directly contributing
to missions’ environmental footprint—which are
embedded in the politics surrounding procurement
for UN peace operations. Procurement policies
answer to member states’ financial and political
interests. Yet these interests may be contrary to the
goals of the Environment Strategy, including to use
more eco-friendly material and technology. This
constitutes a major obstacle for the implementation
of environmentally sound practices.
For instance, a study conducted in 2013 showed
that the top troop-contributing countries were
particularly suspicious of equipment standardiza-
tion projects. Indeed, some member states,
especially developing countries and Russia, were
strongly opposed to environmental standards
under the UN reimbursement system for contin-
gent-owned equipment (decided every three years
in the General Assembly) and under the procure-
ment principles for selecting vendors. Some
governments protested that, if these principles
incorporated strict environmental standards, their
companies would not be competitive enough on
the international market, which would violate the
UN procurement objective of fair, equal, and
geographically equitable treatment of potential
vendors. For example, India declined to provide
air-conditioning systems without ozone-depleting
substances (ODS) for its troops in Haiti, as
required by MINUSTAH in accordance with the
Montreal Protocol’s phaseout deadlines, while it
still had stock of air conditioners with ODS in
India. Russia also strongly argued against environ-
mental standards for mission equipment, presum-
ably in order to protect its market, being a major
supplier of air transport.101
The fact that the Security Council could only
agree on a press statement on the environmental
management of peacekeeping operations in
December 2017 is a consequence and an illustra-
tion of this opposition. Likewise, all mandates for
peace operations from the General Assembly and
the Security Council refer to “existing rules and
regulations” when requesting missions to manage
their environmental impact. The 2017 manual on
reimbursement for contingent-owned equipment
introduced a financial incentive (5 percent) for
troop- and police-contributing countries to deploy
with environmentally enhanced accommodations
or to replace fuel generators with renewable energy
sources.102 However, no agreement has been
reached so far in the Fifth Committee, and debate
continues over the appropriate standards.103
Moreover, in comparison to other violations
committed in the context of peace operations, civil
society has not been advocating very vocally for
greener interventions so far.104 Without public
pressure, member states have managed to slow
down the process of mainstreaming environmental
policies. It is therefore not surprising that it took ten
years for DFS to elaborate its Environment Strategy.
Case Study: The Spatial
Footprint of MINUSMA
We chose to look at the case of MINUSMA as the
first mission with a direct mandate to consider and
manage its environmental impact. This case study
assesses the environmental challenges the mission
is facing, which are illustrative of similar situations.
Since the creation of MINUSMA in 2013, UN
entities have designed and built dozens of camps,
super-camps, headquarters, logistics hubs, and
airfields in fourteen cities across Mali to support its
deployment.105 Although these spaces are mostly
located within existing inhabited areas provided by
the host government, the mission has rarely taken
101  Maertens, “Quand les Casques bleus passent au vert,” pp. 419–420.
102  “An environmental enhancement supplement of an additional 5 per cent of the reimbursement rate to the troop/police contributor will be added if the provided
tentage is shown to have additional features included which are designed to improve the heating and cooling effectiveness and efficiency of the facility.” UN
General Assembly, Manual on Policies and Procedures Concerning the Reimbursement and Control of Contingent-Owned Equipment of Troop/Police Contributors
Participating in Peacekeeping Missions, UN Doc. A/72/288, August 4, 2017.
103  Ibid.
104  In the case of the cholera outbreak in Haiti, the focus has been on official recognition of the UN’s responsibility and compensation packages for the victims.
105  See UN Geospatial Information Section website, available at http://www.un.org/Depts/Cartographic/english/htmain.htm .
  GREENING PEACEKEEPING: THE ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT OF UN PEACE OPERATIONS                                                 23
their multidimensional impacts on the local
population and environment into account in its
planning and procurement processes. UN bases are
designed, constructed, maintained, and prepared
for hand-over according to UN guidelines and
frameworks designed either by a UN civilian
engineering section or by military engineers in
national contingents. Instead, their broad effects on
their surroundings should be investigated from a
multidisciplinary perspective.106
This section focuses on an integrated analysis of
MINUSMA conducted from 2014 to 2016, in
particular of Camp Castor in Gao (designed by the
Dutch contingent and built by the Dutch and the
German contingents) and of the operational base in
Bamako.107 The study revealed that the effectiveness
of an integrated peace operation depends on the
capacities of various UN entities, the local
community, and the environment. Consideration
of these factors should be intrinsic to shaping the
spatial organization of the bases and infrastructure
of UN peace operations. Furthermore, a prelimi-
nary and ongoing integrated analysis could help
UN entities to identify local challenges, resources,
and the potential for long-term regenerative
sustainability, as well as to balance between
localized action and global UN environmental and
sustainable development strategies and agendas.
CAMP CASTOR IN GAO
In Gao, MINUSMA has two main bases that are
located next to each other: Camp Castor (inside of
which contingents’ camps are located and which is
106  UN DPKO, United Nations Peacekeeping Missions Military Engineer Unit Manual, September 2015, pp. 14–21.
107  This part of the report is based on a study initiated and conducted by the Foundation for Achieving Seamless Territory (FAST) with the support of the Dutch
Ministry of Defense and the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs that took place from 2014 to 2016 in the Netherlands through a collaboration among military
engineers, economists, landscape designers, architects, planners, and anthropologists.
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UN bases [Camp Castor 
and the UN super-camp]
Gao airport
Source: FAST, Google Earth
Aerial view of MINUSMA bases in Gao and surrounding area
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Photo 4. Water treatment infrastructure streaming to a water
pool at Camp Castor, Gao, Mali, 2016.Malkit Shoshan/FAST.
Photo 3. Edible gardens next to the Nepalese base at the UN
super-camp, Gao, Mali, 2016.
Photo 2. Hybrid energy plant at Camp Castor, Gao, Mali, 2016.
Malkit Shoshan/FAST.
Photo 1. UN super-camp, Gao, Mali, 2016. Malkit Shoshan/
FAST.
Photo 5. Ecolog base within the UN super-camp, Gao, Mali,
2016. Malkit Shoshan/FAST.
Photo 6. Waste collection at the UN super-camp, Gao, Mali,
2016. Malkit Shoshan/FAST.
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distinct from the rest of MINUSMA’s super-camp),
and an airfield situated alongside the city’s former
international airport. The proximity of the bases to
inhabited areas requires serious consideration of
how the two environments interact: the local
environment and the UN bases (see aerial image).
Camp Castor measures about 800,000 square
meters and is located less than 500 meters from
local housing and 2,800 meters from the city
center. The overall spatial footprint of the UN in
Gao is one-third as big as the city and is located in
an area designated for the city’s future growth.
In MINUSMA’s initial deployment phase, Camp
Castor was composed of tents and improvised
office buildings comprised of “plug-and-play
containers” with no foundations. Everything was
planned to be taken back to the Netherlands at the
end of the mission. Dutch engineers used local
techniques to form and compress laterite roads.
However, the helipad was constructed of concrete
imported from the Netherlands. The fencing
around the perimeter of the base was built of locally
available materials such as concrete, wood, and
metal wires, which inflated local prices of construc-
tion supplies. The first iteration of the camp had
tents and a small rest-and-recuperation facility to
accommodate the arrival of the first 400
peacekeepers.
While the design of Camp Castor was ongoing, it
remained isolated and unconnected to the local
infrastructure for security reasons. Camp Castor’s
electricity was at first provided only by gas and oil
generators, but it was slowly complemented by a set
of solar panels, as the Dutch contingent attempted
to increase the use of renewable energy (see Photo
2). While electricity within the base was available
continuously, the local system in Gao was capable
of providing power for just a few hours a day. At an
early stage of the mission, wells were dug by the UN
and by Dutch engineers to allow immediate access
to water. Sewage, water, electricity, and telecom-
munications pipes and cables were installed
between 1.7 and 2.5 meters underground. An
assortment of filters was installed at the edge of the
base to treat wastewater, and three large pools were
dug to collect the treated water (see Photo 4).
Within the camp, a system of flood protection
channels was dug.
The infrastructure at the base evolved over time,
and the tents were replaced by accommodation
containers with armored shells on top for protec-
tion against rockets. Parts of these structures were
transported to Mali from Afghanistan, where the
Dutch contingent was deployed in the NATO-led
International Security Assistance Force. The metal
prefabricated frames and sheets have limited
thermal insulation, and the hot summer at the edge
of the desert requires extensive use of air
conditioning. Locally produced compressed red
bricks could reduce the environmental footprint of
the mission by improving thermal insulation in the
various structures, reducing the use of air
conditioning, and contributing to local employ-
ment and capacity building.
During the colder months, the average electrical
power consumption in the base is about 450
megawatt-hours/month. In summer, this doubles
to almost 900. The peacekeepers use about 8,500
megawatt-hours yearly, of which 370 are generated
by solar panels and the rest by generators. Water
consumption in Camp Castor is restricted to 100
liters per person per day for showers, cooking, and
cleaning, which is 20 liters over the limit prescribed
by the UN. The drinking water is bottled. In 2017,
the average number of peacekeepers in Camp
Castor was about 1,100.108
The Dutch engineers affirmed that the thinking
behind the design of the base was based only on its
military functionality. The brief timeline, security
concerns, and political framework limited the
possibility of including other considerations. At the
end of a UN mission, the Netherlands reuses
materials it used to construct camps in other Dutch
bases when possible and economically feasible. If
reuse is not possible, it resells or donates the
materials locally or otherwise deconstructs and
disposes of them. It leaves behind sewage, power
systems, fences, and roads. While engineers
provide input, the decision whether to leave parts
of the base intact for local use or break them apart
is mostly political.
Despite its specificities, Camp Castor illustrates
the extent of the physical presence of a UN peace
operation. But while Dutch military engineers
108  Data provided by the Dutch Military Corps of Engineers.
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109  US Central Intelligence Agency, "The World Factbook: Mali," April 9, 2018, available at www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/ml.html .
110  MINUSMA outsources procurement, rations, and waste management to Ecolog. While Ecolog’s headquarters is in Dubai, it supplies material goods and human
resources from around the world to UN mission areas.
111  International Policy Centre for Inclusive Growth, “A New Urban Paradigm: Pathways to Sustainable Development,” UN Development Programme, Policy in
Focus 13, no. 3, available at ; United Nations, “The New Urban Agenda: Key Commitments,” October 20, 2016, available at 
www.un.org/sustainabledevelopment/blog/2016/10/newurbanagenda/ .
112  UNEP, Greening the Blue Report 2016. 
work within the scope and design regulations of the
UN, their bases look different than other UN
camps in their vicinity and other bases within the
same mission. Furthermore, although the UN sets
the design and regulatory framework in advance,
technological know-how and quality of equipment
and materials among different peacekeeping forces
is uneven. As such, UN bases are distinct from one
another not only in their appearance but also in the
environmental footprint they generate.
THE OPERATIONAL BASE IN BAMAKO
Bamako, the capital of Mali, is home to 2.515
million inhabitants and has a population growth
rate of 3.5 percent.109 The MINUSMA operational
base (MOB, distinct from the mission headquarters
located in the Badalabougou neighbourhood in
Bamako) is located northeast of the Bamako-Sénou
International Airport and is surrounded by agricul-
tural fields, farms, and small huts. The closest farm
is located less than 100 meters from the perimeter
of the base, and the edge of the nearest urban
neighborhood is about one kilometer away. Before
the development of the land into a peacekeeping
base by the UN, as the host country proposed, the
area was used as a field for agriculture and grazing.
The UN Engineering Planning and Design Unit
designed MINUSMA’s operational base in collabo-
ration with a freelance architect. The base is
organized along a generic grid structure. It includes
water, energy, and telecommunications infrastruc-
ture as well as a hospital, a library, playgrounds,
parade zones, indoor and outdoor cafeterias, a
conference center, accommodations for the all
source information fusion unit and formed police
unit, areas for security units, and offices for civilian
mission support officers and police and military
staff officers. The layout of the base is organized by
programmatic section and divided by roads.
The base is separated from its surroundings by a
layered security belt of chain link fence and Hesco
bastions (large wire-mesh sandbags), a two-meter-
deep ditch, and an additional 2.6-meter-high
Hesco bastion belt. The last belt incorporates
nineteen watchtowers. The two entrances include a
main point of access to the north along an existing
local road. The principal entrance is surrounded by
buffer zones and a sequence of parking lots. A
smaller entrance to the west is located alongside a
path newly paved by the UN in accordance with the
host government.
The interior parts of the base were gradually
installed from 2015 to 2017. They include a mix of
prefabricated structures and containers. The base
comprises an area of about thirty-six hectares
(comparable to five typical New York City blocks).
Inside the base are small areas allocated for
different programs and contingent troops. In the
southwest of the base, 10,000 square meters of
fenced area are assigned to Ecolog, a private global
logistics company providing rations to
MINUSMA. Ecolog’s area includes a 5,000-square-
meter warehouse, a large borehole, and over a
dozen structures of a range of sizes.110
Contemporary urban paradigms and the UN
2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development
propagate environmentally mindful practices and
emissions reduction through the use of green
buildings and infrastructure.111 Yet most of the
MOB’s infrastructure, containers, and prefabri-
cated structures are flown in from around the
world with limited local sourcing. Moreover, the
standard use of materials such as metal and wood
generates structures that have to be adapted to the
local climate through excessive use of energy for
cooling and heating.112 As a result, the UN method
of building and maintaining its camps has an
extensive environmental and carbon footprint.
MINUSMA’s operational base and Camp Castor
demonstrate the mission’s significant impact on
the Malian environment. If the UN adopted a
strategy of regenerative sustainability, its missions
could be regarded as resources that contribute to
lasting sustainability for cities like Bamako and
Gao. These cities struggle to respond to their
rapidly growing population with adequate urban
expansion and infrastructure, particularly
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concerning access to water, food, energy, health-
care, education and telecommunications networks.
As mentioned above, UN bases operate for an
average of about 6.5 years. In this time frame, they
can gradually evolve to support and strengthen
urban services.
Recommendations
While this report focuses on UN peace operations’
environmental concerns and practices, it does not
imply that environmental management is one of
their main activities, even though, as a crosscutting
issue, it does touch upon much of what they do. Yet
despite being less central to the core mandate of
peace operations, environmental problems echo
the “do no harm” principle and deserve greater
attention because of their potentially destructive
effects as unintended consequences.
Based on this review of environmental concerns
and issues at stake and of the current Environment
Strategy and its weaknesses, we put forward a series
of recommendations. Advocating for a better
understanding of long-term impacts, we suggest
ways to mitigate and reduce UN peace operations’
environmental footprint and the environmental
pressure they place on local ecosystems and
communities.
SHORT-TERM RECOMMENDATIONS
Since early 2017, DFS has had a strong
Environment Strategy with a vision and timeline.
These short-term recommendations concern the
full implementation of the strategy and the
achievement of its objectives.
1. Increase financial and human resources
dedicated to the implementation of the
Environment Strategy and to planning.
Each mission should be given adequate human
resources to implement and comply with the
Environmental Policy, depending on its charac-
teristics (availability of local infrastructure,
deployment in hard-to-reach areas, number of
camps, etc.). Member states should allow
adequate staff, including environmental officers
in missions and in headquarters in charge of
facilitating the implementation of the
Environmental Policy and guidelines, assessing
compliance with them, preventing environ-
mental damage, promoting eco-friendly
practices, and systematically collecting lessons
learned.
Member states and mission leadership should
also strengthen human resources in the areas of
engineering and urban planning by reviewing
terms of reference for positions in mission
support and appointing at least one environ-
mental engineer per mission (in addition to the
environmental officers in the Office of the
Director of Mission Support). Urban planners
should also be commissioned to provide prelim-
inary spatial and socioeconomic analyses of the
local context to help identify opportunities for
collaboration and local sourcing in the short
and long term (if assessments indicate this
would not have a negative impact on the
environment). Moreover, these preliminary
analyses and the presence of environmental
engineers could be used to train other engineers
and UN actors in each mission on a holistic
approach to environmental management.
Adequate human and financial resources should
also be devoted to planning missions to ensure
that infrastructure integrates and strengthens
local systems in the short and long term.
Member states and DFS should focus on three
main areas:
a. Energy, by providing funding to focus more
on energy efficiency and on renewable
energy when feasible;
b. Water and wastewater, by financially
supporting projects to install and operate all
treatment plants without any risk and to
monitor groundwater; and
c. Solid waste management (an area that so far
has no dedicated positions), by appointing
waste management officers in engineering
sections in charge of designing and
managing missions’ infrastructure.
2. Implement mandatory training on environ-
mental management for all personnel in
missions.
DFS and DPKO should ensure that environ-
mental issues are included in pre-deployment
training for all civilians operating in missions.
Troop- and police-contributing countries
should include environmental management in
the pre-deployment training of their troops and
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police. Drawing on the increase in human
resources proposed above, in-mission training
on environmental management should also be
mandatory for all uniformed personnel.
Training modules should seek to raise general
awareness of issues related to natural resources
and the environment as well as to provide
specific technical knowledge. They should also
address the specificities of the local context.
3. Systematically collect data on environmental
management from all missions and dissemi-
nate lessons learned and best practices.
In order to assess improvements and set achiev-
able goals in terms of energy efficiency; water,
wastewater, and solid waste management; and
environmental restoration, DFS should develop
consistent methodologies to collect comparable
data over time. Member states should mandate
each mission to assess its environmental
footprint and the potential risks of its presence
for the environment and local communities’
livelihoods. The environmental assessment
should also take into account the long-term
effects of both degradation and regeneration of
the resources used by the UN.
The UN should also strengthen its capacity to
collect and disseminate lessons learned and best
practices about environmental management
and the reduction of missions’ footprint. DFS
should be vocal not only about its best practices
but also about lessons learned from bad experi-
ences and include them in annual reporting to
member states.
4. Use local capacities where feasible.
DFS should consider sourcing its maintenance
locally where feasible. The most significant
contributor to the UN environmental footprint
is the transport of people and goods into
missions by air, sea, or land. The use of local
materials, depending on thorough environ-
mental and economic assessments of the
possible medium- and long-term impact, and
local expertise can exponentially reduce the cost
and environmental footprint of UN missions.
Moreover, after the first months of deployment,
regulated local production of supplies could
provide employment, help build capacity, and
sustain environmentally minded growth, which
could eventually contribute to sustainable
development not only at the local level but also
globally. For instance, if food production is
sourced locally when feasible, peace operations
could reduce the environmental footprint
caused by long-distance transportation of
produce and support small-scale farmers,
agricultural production, food access, and food
security.
MEDIUM-TERM RECOMMENDATIONS
Due to the difficulty of implementing them, the
following recommendations are considered to be
medium-term targets, even though they might
address very urgent matters.
5. Continue to reinforce oversight by systemati-
cally monitoring performance indicators and
fostering data ownership and accountability.
UN headquarters should continue to reinforce
its capacity to oversee the implementation of its
Environment Strategy in two ways. First, it
should continue efforts to strengthen reporting
between missions and headquarters through
both formal mechanisms (e.g., mandatory
participation by every mission in the monthly
video meetings set up for each pillar, regular
field visits, formal audits) and informal
meetings between DFS’s Environment Section
and environmental officers in the field.
Second, it should regularly audit data supplied
by missions. Data ownership should be system-
atically established and formal mechanisms put
in place to hold data owners accountable for the
accuracy of the information they supply.
6. Extend DFS’s partnership with UNEP.
DFS should extend its REACT partnership with
UNEP to offer permanent technical assistance at
UN headquarters, at the Global Service Centre
in Brindisi, and in missions. DFS should also
seek support from UNEP to advocate for more
environmentally responsible peace operations.
7. Advocate for member states to support
sustainable environmental management in
peace operations.
DFS should seek support from member states,
building on the “Group of Friends on Leading
on Environmental Management in the Field”
and on the 2017 Security Council press
statement. While highlighting the long-term
benefits of more sustainable interventions, DFS
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should warn member states of the significant
risks and potentially disastrous effects of
noncompliance with the Environmental Policy
and guidelines and remind the UN of its obliga-
tion to apply the “do no harm” principle. DFS
should advocate for member states to provide
adequate human and financial resources to
enable effective compliance with the
Environmental Policy and Environment
Strategy. DFS should request member states to
create legal obligations that would enable
liability for noncompliance.
LONG-TERM RECOMMENDATION
This last recommendation addresses long-term
issues. By focusing on local settings and compre-
hensive and integrated indicators, it relates to the
UN’s legacy and accountability even long after the
departure of missions.
8. Develop comprehensive indicators and an
integrated approach to environmental
concerns
The footprint of UN peace operations should be
examined through multidisciplinary and multi-
scalar methods by environmental engineers,
economists, and urban planners. They should
examine the footprint at a variety of levels and
in different contexts, from the site to the local
region, the country, and the global environ-
ment, to identify the negative impact on natural
and man-made environments and to prevent
misunderstanding of the local context.
The footprint of each peacekeeper and physical
structure, such as bases, airfields, and headquar-
ters, must also be measured in relation to local
circumstances and capacities. By measuring the
environmental footprint of peace operations in
a more context-specific way, DFS can identify
concrete challenges and the potential to foster a
positive legacy.
As such, each mission should be analyzed from
a comprehensive environmental and spatial
perspective that takes into account its impact on
the local context. Such an approach will necessi-
tate the development of indicators that comple-
ment the current Environment Strategy. Such
indicators can be developed through collabora-
tion among urban designers, environmental
officers, engineers, and local experts. Based on
such an analysis, actions can be taken to build
capacity and reduce the footprint of UN peace
operations from beginning to end.
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